Article’s

The proliferation of cloud computing infrastructures has compelled organizations to adopt distributed architectures for the storage, processing, and dissemination of sensitive information. Although these platforms deliver unparalleled scalability and adaptability, they concurrently engender intricate security vulnerabilities, most notably in the domains of authorization and access governance. Central to mitigating these risks is the Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP), a cornerstone security doctrine that prescribes granting entities solely the essential permissions requisite for their designated functions, thereby curtailing the expanse of potential breaches stemming from credential compromise. This investigation undertakes a rigorous examination of prevailing cloud authorization paradigms, appraised through the prism of parsimonious security imperatives. It scrutinizes the efficacy with which extant models uphold PoLP stipulations within multifaceted, multi-tenant cloud ecosystems. Conventional methodologies—encompassing Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), and Policy-Based Access Control (PBAC)— undergo methodical appraisal, juxtaposed against nascent frameworks such as relational, risk-responsive, credence- oriented, and situational authorization constructs.